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 Abstract 
Transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are commonly regarded either as 
agents of empire or as manifestations of the progressive enlightenment of humankind. 
This paper takes a different view, arguing that they are best characterized as versatile 
factors of global cooperation across regional, ideological, and sectoral boundaries. Whilst 
recognizing that multilateral cooperation is sought not as an end in itself but as a means 
of intervening on behalf of oppressed groups who are engaged in struggles for recognition, 
I argue that the physical and psychological distance of many NGO activists from these 
struggles can distort patterns of cooperation and practices of recognition. I conclude that, 
far from simply being lauded as harbingers of a transnational, post-Westphalian 
democratic order, NGOs should be seen as the human face of the ‘global rise of the 
unelected’, with deeply paradoxical implications for the future of transnational 
governance. 
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Global Cooperation and Economies of 
Recognition: The Case of NGOs 
 
 
Volker M. Heins 
 
Introduction1 
Humiliation is the single most powerful  
human emotion, and overcoming it is the  
second most powerful human emotion. 
Thomas Friedman (2011) 
There is a growing consensus that the key to social and global justice is to 
overcome the sense of powerless and the lack of self-respect that prevails among 
impoverished, marginalized, and oppressed populations. As political theorist John 
Rawls puts it, self-respect is a ‘primary good’ whose production depends on the 
make-up of basic social and political institutions. More precisely, justice is the name 
of behaviours that form the ‘social bases of self-respect’ (Rawls 1993: 319). Like 
Rawls’s liberal theory of justice, neo-Hegelian theories of recognition emphasize 
the centrality of mutual respect and esteem in the development of human relations 
and identities (Taylor 1994; Honneth 1995; Ricoeur 2005; Ikäheimo 2014). The core 
notion underpinning theories of recognition is that human autonomy and agency 
are not givens but are the result of a continuous and dynamic process of mutual 
recognition between persons and groups. Recognition is about constituting and 
performing inclusion, actorness, and membership. To be recognized as a legitimate 
actor and a full member of society implies more than simply having legal rights. In 
modern societies, there is a wide range of social relations based on respect, 
esteem, and affection, which, taken together, constitute ‘the opposite of practices 
of domination or subjection’ (Honneth 2007c: 325; see also Honneth 2014). 
Recently, theories of recognition have begun to venture into the realms of 
International Relations and international political theory (Lebow 2008: 62–9; 
Ringmar and Lindemann 2011; Wolf 2011; Honneth 2012; Heins 2012; Burns and 
Thompson 2013; Geis et al., forthcoming). However, there are limits to the degree 
to which recognition theory can be internationalized. This is essentially because 
such theory deals only with subjects that are both recognized and recognizers, 
                                                          
 1  A version of this paper was given at a workshop of the Cluster of Excellence ‘The Formation of 
Normative Orders’ at Goethe University in Frankfurt. I am particularly indebted to Caroline 
Fehl and Anna Geis for specific suggestions. The text has also benefited from discussions with 
David Chandler, Tobias Debiel and Birgit Schwelling at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for 
Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg. A slightly different version of the paper will be 
published in Geis et al. (forthcoming). 
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allowing a struggle for mutual recognition to take place. Thus, only human beings 
are relevant units of moral concern, not states, nations, cultures, principles, or 
similar phenomena dear to IR scholars.2 This focus on natural as opposed to 
artificial persons restricts the purview of the ‘new paradigm’ (Ikäheimo 2014: 11). 
On the other hand, recognition theorists make claims that resonate with much of 
the research on global cooperation and conflict. In particular it is argued that 
protest and opposition to domestic and international institutions cannot be 
explained as a consequence of deviant behaviour, political indoctrination, or 
economic deprivation but is ultimately driven by persons and groups experiencing 
moral injuries in the form of disrespect, denigration, or undue indifference. 
Moreover, it is argued that experiences of humiliation do not just drive conflicts but 
also justify them in the eyes of witnesses and distant publics. The empirical ways in 
which people respond to humiliation and oppression tell us something about the 
underlying norms that have been infringed and that are worth defending. It is this 
genuine interest in the dynamics of real struggles, as opposed to mere argument 
and deliberation, which makes theories of recognition potentially interesting even 
for IR researchers with realist inclinations. 
In this paper, I will focus on one particular group of non-state actors—
transnational non-governmental organizations—and explore how recognition 
theory may help us to better understand them. NGOs are of relevance not only to 
scholars interested in the role played by citizens and activists in the construction of 
global governance and new forms of diplomacy (Alger 2007; Willets 2011; Cooper 
2013; Ruggie 2014) but also to researchers studying the impact of real or 
fabricated collective feelings of humiliation in international relations. Unlike states, 
non-governmental advocacy organizations can plausibly claim to be fighting for the 
recognition of the rights and needs of all human beings, regardless of their 
national belonging. For this reason, these groups are natural candidates for an 
analysis in terms of recognition theory. In fact, there appears to be broad 
convergence between the intentions of NGOs and the ‘project of moralizing world 
politics’ (Honneth 2007a: 198) championed by recognition theorists. 
The remainder of this paper outlines the connections between NGOs, patterns of 
global cooperation, and different practices of (mis)recognition in international 
politics. The first section offers a new definition of NGOs in relation to global 
demands for recognition. Section 2 discusses the role of NGOs in facilitating global 
cooperation on international harm conventions aimed at dissuading states and 
other actors from using their enormous destructive power against humans or other 
sentient beings. In section 3, I distinguish different sorts of recognition and ask 
how these shape patterns of cooperation and how practices of recognition can turn 
out to be ambivalent, pointless, or even pernicious. Section 4 provides a brief 
overview of the ways in which transnational NGOs can themselves become agents 
of ‘bad’ recognition. I conclude that far from simply being lauded as harbingers of a 
transnational democratic order, NGOs should be seen as the human face of the 
‘global rise of the unelected’ (Vibert 2007), with deeply paradoxical implications for 
the future of transnational governance. 
                                                          
 2 On the difference between natural persons and the agency of states and other corporate 
entities, see Wendt (1999: 221-224). 
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1 Third-party Interveners 
Much has been made of the fact that NGOs are voluntary civil associations 
independent of state power. Both descriptions are valid, if applied correctly. NGOs 
such as Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières—MSF), Human Rights 
Watch, or Oxfam are certainly independent in the sense that they are not 
competing for a share of governmental power and do not have a governmental 
mandate either for their existence or for their activities. There is also no doubt that 
they depend to a large extent on the voluntary commitment of supporters and 
donors who are willing to spend time and money on a particular moral cause. The 
only reason transnational NGOs are able to play an increasingly prominent role in 
global governance is because there is a deeply rooted culture of giving throughout 
the world. Such groups are both receivers and givers of gifts, initiators of, and 
elements in, worldwide chains of aid.3  
However, NGOs are also involved in global social struggles—which I accept are 
ultimately rooted in the experiences of groups that are not only materially 
disadvantaged but also feel that they have been treated with contempt or 
indifference. These feelings run deep and are largely impervious to argument. 
Many kinds of social suffering have normative meaning in the sense that they result 
from the violation of well-founded moral expectations or principles. Acting as 
ethical witnesses, NGOs transform these violated principles into ‘issues’, around 
which they attempt to mobilize distant, sometimes global, publics. They are key 
agents in the global amplification of feelings of humiliation and disrespect. 
More precisely, they are third-party interveners in global struggles for 
recognition. Their personnel is typically recruited not by or from amongst local 
victims of injustice but by and from amongst distant sympathizers who speak and 
act on behalf of, but without authorization from, others. NGOs are rallying round 
an ever-expanding range of issues, calling on spectators to takes sides and bear 
moral witness. However, when they and their supporters pledge their backing, they 
do so without ‘becoming one’ with the victim groups they are supposedly 
protecting and defending. Indeed, NGO activists often know very little about the 
groups concerned or their culture—only that they are oppressed or 
disenfranchised. They do not join them in the way foreigners signed up to fight in 
the Spanish Civil War, or in the way the sons and daughters of the European 
bourgeoisie became committed communists after the October Revolution in 
Russia. Nor do they represent their beneficiaries. Representation would entail an 
authorization procedure that would make it possible to ascribe the activities of 
NGOs to those on whose behalf they were acting. The representational activities of 
NGOs are symbolic not political: what such organizations claim to do is fight for 
global change for victims symbolically depicted as innocent, oppressed, neglected, 
dispossessed, excluded, disenfranchised, or forgotten. Instead of a genuinely 
representational relationship, what we see is a tension between imagined 
                                                          
 3 The World Giving Index ranks nations according to the time and money they donate to NGOs. 
Its 2013 Top 20 list, though headed by the United States and Canada, features Myanmar in 
third place and a number of other Asian countries and African nations within this top group. 
Only 5 of the countries in the ranking are members of the Group of Twenty (G20), which 
comprises 19 of the world’s largest economies plus the European Union (Charities Aid 
Foundation 2013). 
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closeness and physical separation. I suspect that this fundamental disconnect 
between transnational NGOs and the victims of injustice whom they claim to 
defend harbours a considerable potential for unintentional disrespect. 
Before I explore this further, I should like to make three observations that may 
serve as corollaries to my definition of NGOs as voluntary civil associations, ethical 
witnesses, third-party interveners, and institutional expressions of cultures of 
giving. 
Firstly, NGOs cannot be seen merely as conventional interest groups or as ‘self-
sacrificing knights in shining armour’ (Bloodgood 2011: 94). Rather, they combine 
the pursuit of moral causes with a constant jockeying for funding and turf. What 
makes them different from interest groups is the nature of their core constituency. 
This is drawn from amongst a strongly value-oriented pool of ‘true believers’ and 
‘public-spirited zealots’ who want to work in a non-commercial environment and 
whose own well-being depends on their being able to contribute to the well-being 
of others (Feinberg 1984: 73, 76; Frantz 2005: ch. 4; Hopgood 2006: ch. 2; Heins 
2008; Mitchell and Schmitz, forthcoming). NGOs are other-regarding agents in so 
far as their members typically defend the interests of groups they do not belong 
to. The ‘others’ in question are: a) people in need living in geographically distant 
regions; b) temporally distant strangers such as members of future generations or 
individuals who have died as victims of forgotten or under reported crimes by the 
state; and c) non-human species and their habitats. NGOs do not follow in the 
footsteps of self-liberation movements; rather, they emulate the abolitionists who 
fought against the transatlantic slave trade and against bonded labour in the 
American South—and whose success depended on white non-slaves publicly 
empathizing with the black enslaved. In a similar way, today’s transnational NGOs 
call on the well-off to help the poor, on citizens to support refugees, on adults to 
act for children, on humans to protect animals, and on the generations of today to 
have regard for those of tomorrow. Tocqueville’s general remarks about ‘private 
associations’ in many cases apply to transnational NGOs: they ‘renew the opinions’ 
and ‘enlarge the hearts’ of citizens (Tocqueville 2003: 599). 
Secondly, transnational NGOs should be seen as institutional expressions of a 
broader shift—away from a politics based on the pursuit of national, imperial, or 
class interests and towards one that is less self-centred and more ethical. There is a 
trend—not only among NGOs but also among powerful states and transnational 
organizations—to counter narrowly conceived national objectives by invoking 
universal human rights, human security, and the welfare of populations around the 
globe. This rhetoric is not purely ideological, but it should not be taken at face 
value either. The disorientation has arisen because interests today are more 
diffuse, contested, and interwoven than in earlier phases of the development of 
national and international societies, when states, and groups within states, faced 
one monolithic enemy, as they saw it, rather than a panoply of threats ranging from 
home grown terrorism to environmental disaster. It is not that ethics have 
triumphed over interest. More accurately, strong, absorbing, and clearly legitimate 
interests have been weakened by the advent of new constellations of power and 
powerlessness. One unfortunate consequence of this has been a rise in the number 
of international interventions and foreign policy adventures marked by a dearth of 
strategic clarity, inter-ally dependability, and long-term commitment. Examples 
here are the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, the alleged war for women’s 
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rights in Afghanistan, the so-called liberation of Iraq, and other such wild goose 
chases. 
Thirdly, NGOs are highly engaging facilitators of global cooperation. Compared to 
individuals, states have more options for avoiding or withdrawing from cooperation 
with other states (Wendt 1999: 223; Heins 2014). However, even when they do 
cooperate, they are ill-equipped to reach out to non-state actors in international 
society. By contrast, NGOs are able to cooperate with a broad range of actors, from 
individual celebrities to other local and global NGOs, and to businesses, military 
forces, and government officials from different national and geographical 
backgrounds. They are multifunctional and ‘multilingual’, adept at switching codes 
and interacting simultaneously with a number of different environments. Examples 
here are the huge coalitions associated with the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. This distinctive feature of easy 
facilitation can be expressed in terms of recognition theory. Following Heikki 
Ikäheimo (2014: 17–18), I suggest two distinctions that are of relevance here: 
horizontal versus vertical and purely intersubjective versus institutionally mediated. 
Horizontal recognition is recognition between like-minded groups of persons; 
vertical recognition is recognition between groups and powerful institutions or 
authorities. Purely intersubjective recognition operates in cases where persons 
connect on the basis of sympathy and shared ideas, whereas institutionally 
mediated recognition operates between actors who relate to each other as holders 
of institutional roles. Because they combine these different kinds of intellectual, 
affective, legal, and strategic relationships, NGOs are key components in changing 
global economies of recognition. 
Drawing on the conceptual distinction between different sorts of recognition, I 
would like to highlight three major types of recognition-seeking behaviour typical 
of transnational NGOs. 1. Many NGOs and campaigns only come into being as a 
result of purely intersubjective encounters between individuals who discover that 
they share an impulse to act against a particular perceived injustice.4 2. Once 
established, NGOs strive to get ‘horizontal’ recognition from sympathetic donors, 
partners, and like-minded officials. These endeavours take place in institutionally 
mediated situations in which all actors have rights and duties. 3. NGOs then seek 
‘vertical’ recognition from states and international organizations. The very term 
‘NGO’ is indicative, pointing as it does to its origins as a classificatory device 
introduced by governments in the context of international organizations to enable 
the inclusion, and raise the status, of entities other than governments. In order to 
be able to participate in international conferences convened by the United Nations, 
NGOs have to go through a quasi-diplomatic accreditation process. In other cases, 
the eligibility and status of NGOs is determined by governments. Keen to retain 
and enhance the moral reputation of their organizations, NGO leaders have to 
juggle several demands, some of which are contradictory. Although they prefer to 
stay ‘pure’ by collaborating solely along horizontal lines, with like-minded actors in 
global civil society, they often opt for strategies that involve collaboration with 
                                                          
 4 As an example: much of the famous campaign against the Narmada Dam project in India can 
be traced back to initial contacts between local Indian activists and Bruce Rich of the US-
based Environmental Defense Fund (Pallas and Urpelainen 2013: 416). 
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government agencies, because this is a way to increased funding and legitimacy 
(Mitchell, forthcoming).5 
2 NGOs and Harm Conventions 
We can now give a general answer to the question of how NGOs intervene in 
struggles for recognition. Most of their activities in the field of international 
advocacy can be summed up as an effort to a) secure binding rules that are designed 
to prevent harm being done to innocent others by constraining the power of states, 
businesses, and armed non-state actors, and b) bring about the establishment of 
institutions of civil repair and moral regeneration where harm has already been 
done. There is always some notion of harm at the core of NGO activity. ‘Harm’ is 
here understood not as a setback to interests but as an experience of being treated 
unjustly. Harming is synonymous with wronging (Feinberg 1984, ch. 3). To inflict 
harm in this sense is, by definition, morally indefensible because it implies the 
violation of a person’s most basic rights. 
These basic rights are defended by a variety of means: a rhetoric of victimhood 
that raises awareness about abuses, seen and unseen, and attributes guilt and 
innocence; the gathering of data on such abuses; the transformation of moral 
causes into media-saturated ‘issues’ of compelling public interest; and strategies 
involving lobbying for what Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami call 
international or cosmopolitan ‘harm conventions’ such as the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Biosafety Protocol, and 
the ICC’s Rome Statute (Linklater and Hidemi 2006: 176–87). A key aspect of NGO 
intervention is the construction of issues out of real world claims and grievances—
and indeed out of situations in which the victims of the injustice concerned have not 
even raised their voices. This process of constructing new issues is constrained by 
powerful gatekeepers in the NGO world who for one reason or another may decide 
not to ‘adopt’ an issue (Carpenter 2010). Without these gatekeepers, the universe of 
possible issues would be virtually boundless. 
In Table 1 I provide a simple matrix capturing the issues around which NGOs can 
theoretically start gathering data, devise solutions, mobilize global audiences, and 
lobby international organizations. The table should be read not as a grid but as a 
menu allowing various combinations of items from the different columns. The first 
column reminds us that state power has never been regarded as the only source of 
harm. Since people do not necessarily fight each other only in state-run armies—
witness the conflicts between independent ethnic and religious groups—war is 
potentially a source of harm separate from the state. The same is true of industry, 
given its capitalist, non-state permutations. It is my contention that all sources of 
harm relevant to the politics of contemporary NGOs are reducible to these three: 
state power, war, and industry. In a departure from much of classical political theory, 
neither ‘nature’ nor ‘human nature’ figures as a distinct source of human suffering—
meaning that a struggle for recognition can still be waged but that there is no 
                                                          
 5 This has been particularly true in the human rights field, where NGOs have become much 
more influential over the last few decades, not at the expense of states, but in shifting 
alliances with some of them (see e.g. Heins et al. 2010). 
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possibility of pointing to particular actors as causally or morally responsible. Neither 
the argument that ‘man is a wolf to man’, nor the view that the world is an 
inhospitable place subject to the whims of fortune, is taken into account. Extreme 
weather events that cause enormous damage to life, health, and property, naturally 
galvanize NGOs into action; but even relief agencies tend to attribute the sufferings 
of hurricane victims and the like to the prior failure of government agencies to 
invest in disaster preparedness and emergency-response systems. Similarly, the 
AIDS crisis has been framed as being made worse by pharmaceutical corporations 
and the patent laws protecting them. In all these cases, states and corporations, 
even if they are not considered causally responsible for the harm suffered by others, 
tend to be judged as at least ‘passively unjust’ (Shklar 1990: 56). 
Classical other-regarding associations mostly focused on the general class of 
humans as victims of harm. They called upon military commanders, lawmakers, and 
the public to regard and treat others as fellow humans by abstracting from qualities 
such as skin colour, national belonging, and cultural background—either 
permanently (as in the case of slavery) or temporarily (as in the case of soldiers and 
civilians injured or captured in war). Animals too were considered potential victims 
of mistreatment and senseless killing, but they were defended on the basis of their 
unique species-related qualities, not on the basis of an imagined ‘common animality’ 
analogous to the common humanity of wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, bonded 
labourers, or slaves. Over time, the list of victims deemed worthy of inclusion in 
global advocacy campaigns has grown enormously. The third column of the table 
lists some of the most common types of harm to which humans and non-humans can 
be subjected. These can be broken down further, into countless other, more specific 
types of harm. The fourth column indicates that in responding to these harmful 
activities, activists can opt either for blanket prohibition or for regulatory 
provisions. Which of these is chosen depends partly on how radical single groups are 
and partly on what pre-existing norms there are for dealing with the harmful 
practices in question. It would be ludicrous to call for anything less than the 
complete prohibition of practices such as slavery; on the other hand, there are very 
few NGOs calling for a total prohibition on the killing of humans, under any 
circumstances, or for a total ban on war. 
Table 1. Generating issues for NGOs 
Sources of harm Victims of harm Acts of harming Harm conventions 
  killing  
state power humans mistreating  
 animals disenfranchising Prohibition 
war  enslaving  
 children ‘disappearing’ Regulation 
  trafficking  
industry women damaging  
 minorities raping  
  excluding  
 ecosystems neglecting  
  stigmatizing  
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As new victims of harm and new categories or subcategories of harming have 
been discovered, new issues have emerged. An early addition to the list, 
complementing slavery and cruelty to animals, was the issue of ‘children in war’. 
This prompted the creation of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
Save the Children and has itself generated additional issues such as those of war 
orphans, child refugees, and child soldiers. 
The table can also be used as a heuristic device. By combining key words from the 
first two columns and running down the list of harmful acts in the third column, we 
find clues to the range of issues around which campaigns have emerged or may 
emerge in the future. At the interface between ‘industry’ and ‘children’, for 
instance, we find issues such as those of child labour and the abuse of children by 
the global sex industry, which have gained prominence in recent times. The adverse 
effects suffered by women as a result of war have similarly attracted increasing 
attention: ‘sexual violence in armed conflicts’ has been transformed into an issue 
by women’s rights groups and has been successfully institutionalized by recent war 
crimes tribunals, which have declared the systematic rape of women to be a crime 
against humanity. Even the effects of war on animals have become an issue, with 
animal rights groups organizing or advocating rescue missions to save pets 
abandoned by their owners in war zones and disaster zones. The overall trend in 
the ‘issue pool’ (Carpenter 2012: 32) administered by transnational activists is one 
of constant growth. The explanation for this is more likely to be found on the 
supply side than on the demand side. It is not that things are forever getting worse; 
it is rather that our capacity to discover and describe forms of avoidable suffering is 
improving. 
3 Varieties of Bad Recognition 
At this juncture, I would like to point to a crucial ambivalence in recognition 
theory. It is often assumed that systematic disrespect creates a pull towards a 
meaningful struggle for recognition. At the same time, it seems clear that struggles 
for recognition cannot be traced directly back to particular grievances in the way, 
say, that a disease can be traced back to an infection. Inchoate feelings of not being 
sufficiently respected or esteemed do not, of themselves, have any force. Honneth 
writes that ‘moral feelings—until now, the emotional raw materials [Rohstoff] of 
social conflicts—lose their apparent innocence and turn out to be retarding or 
accelerating moments within an overarching developmental process’ (Honneth 
1995: 168 Honneth 2012; see also the discussion in Heins 2012). Like raw materials, 
grievances are undirected and mouldable. For this reason, struggles for recognition 
are open-ended. There is no such thing as an autopilot to keep these struggles on 
course towards emancipatory goals. Being fuzzy in their understanding of who is to 
blame for what, they allow for a wide range of not always ethical behaviours and 
outcomes. But once they degenerate into something resembling a pub brawl, with 
no intelligible trigger, they cease to be struggles for recognition and can only be 
brought to an end by general exhaustion or the intervention of an outside police 
force. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to bear in mind that a lot can go 
wrong on the path from unformed moral feelings of humiliation to collective action 
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and political outcomes. With this in mind, I distinguish four types of ‘bad’ 
recognition or ways in which recognitive attitudes towards others can go awry: 
misplaced recognition; ideological recognition with intended harmful 
consequences; well-meaning recognition with unintended harmful consequences; 
and merely gestural recognition, with no consequences for others. 
1. Recognition can be given to ‘undeserving’ subjects. Where the suffering 
of human beings results from disasters in which wilful ignorance or a 
misplaced sense of pride on the part of the sufferer has been a major 
contributing factor, certain kinds of recognition may not be 
appropriate. Victims of such suffering will still be candidates for 
general attention, compassion, and respect for their basic rights, but it 
would be inappropriate to extend to them the kind of solidarity 
extended to people whose suffering can be attributed to the 
intentional wrongdoing of governments and other powerful actors. 
We should also consider how far we should go in extending 
recognition beyond the circle of natural persons. Do states and 
cultures deserve respect? And how does this respect differ from the 
kind of recognition we owe to human beings? Should we treat certain 
categories of animals as persons or fellow citizens, as Sue Donaldson 
and Will Kymlicka (2011) have suggested? There is no denying that the 
need to be recognized is at once fundamental and rarely fulfilled; but 
it is also true that recognition can be misplaced, overdone, or 
trivialized. 
2. Recognition can have intended harmful consequences. ‘Some rebukes 
are praises, and some praises are slanders’, writes La Rochefoucauld 
(2007: 43). In more theoretical terms: the act of recognizing the 
positive qualities of others can be an ideological move, aimed at 
consolidating asymmetrical relations of power. In such cases, 
recognition diminishes rather than enhances the opportunity for 
further self-development and freedom. Honneth (2007c) mentions the 
example of the ‘happy slave’ character Uncle Tom. Other examples of 
figures trapped within paralysing self-images created by false 
recognition from the powerful are: the heroic soldier, the good 
housewife, the loyal ally, the model minority, and Frantz Fanon’s over-
assimilated colonial subject, who aspires to speak ‘proper’ French 
(Fanon 1967: ch. 1). In contrast to the kind of double-edged praise 
these subjects may win for their achievements, true recognition, 
according to Honneth, is backed up by tangible civil rights and material 
provisions. But even under well-defined conditions such as these, 
recognition can be intentionally harmful. Recognition and reward may 
be given to one set of workers as a way of putting down another. 
Controversial publications—such as cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed—may be used as an opportunity to reaffirm the right to 
free speech interpreted as a licence to offend already marginalized 
minorities. 
3. Recognition can have unintended harmful consequences. The danger of 
this is particularly acute where substantial asymmetries of power 
facilitate paternalistic practices and discourses. In the international 
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arena, for example, the recognition of human rights often involves the 
stereotyping of people as either innocent ‘victims’, deviant 
‘perpetrators’, or shamefully indifferent ‘bystanders’. This in turn can 
feed into arrogant and over-moralizing views about those whose 
voices are drowned out. The philosopher Onora O’Neill gets to the 
root of the problem when she argues that international human rights 
law, instead of assigning states straightforward obligations to respect 
rights, obliges them to secure respect for such rights by governing the 
behaviour of others. These second-order obligations empower states 
to control an ever-wider range of individuals and organizations who 
are compelled to produce goods, deliver services, and conduct 
themselves in such a way as to avoid incurring the blame of human 
rights advocates. The unintended consequence of the recognition of 
human rights may be a trend towards ‘establishing systems of control 
and discipline that extend into the remotest corners of life’ (O’Neill 
2005: 439). 
4. Recognition can have no consequences at all. Whereas some forms of 
recognition are duplicitous and self-serving, others occupy the 
opposite extreme of lacking any strategic engagement. David 
Chandler has made the point that ‘the goal of political protest 
becomes increasingly an end in itself in the form of raising awareness’ 
(Chandler 2009 17; Cronin-Furman and Taub 2012; Chouliaraki 2013). 
Big words accompany small or ineffectual deeds. Sporting AIDS 
ribbons or changing Facebook profiles in support of a cause are 
examples of attitudes of recognition without tangible consequences. 
Sometimes such gestures are also needlessly moralizing. Thomas 
Pogge claims that citizens of rich countries, simply by virtue of being 
citizens, are responsible for the state of the world and thereby also for 
the violation of the human rights of citizens in poor countries. 
According to Pogge, the only legitimate way to deal with this original 
sin of belonging to the category of rich countries is to act like Oskar 
Schindler, who famously ‘compensated for’ living in Germany under 
the Nazi government by rescuing Jews (Pogge 2005). The trouble with 
this analogy is that readers may feel entitled to think of themselves as 
latter-day Oskar Schindlers simply because they buy locally grown 
vegetables or make donations to NGOs, regardless of whether such 
actions have any wider consequences. Whereas acts of ideological 
recognition aim at consolidating asymmetrical power relations within 
societies and across international boundaries, acts of gestural 
recognition may be doing little more than satisfying our own sense of 
retributive morality. 
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4 Cooperation in a Moral Maze 
By constructing, adopting, or suppressing certain issues, transnational NGOs add 
an additional layer of interpretation and choice between the alleged victims of 
injustice and the global public. They speak for victims by re-narrating their 
experiences of injustice and by filtering them through cognitive frames. To 
determine whether NGOs contribute not just to more effective cooperation but 
also to a genuine moralization of world politics, I shall now apply my four-fold 
typology of bad recognition to the world of NGOs. 
Evidence of organizations campaigning for the recognition of ‘undeserving’ 
subjects or intentionally recognizing people as a way of turning them into ‘Uncle 
Tom’ types (see types 1 and 2 above) is thin on the ground. By contrast, examples 
of NGO campaigns that make no difference to the situation of victims on the 
ground (type 4) are easy to find. In regard to the latter, there are two possible 
reasons for the ineffectuality: either we are dealing with narcissistic, ‘feel-good’ 
activism, which by its nature is ineffectual; or the activists in question are serious 
but not committed deeply enough to the issue in hand—their outward devotion to 
universal benevolence conceals a managerial indifference. Since NGOs are typically 
not accountable to a large membership base with well-defined interests, nor bound 
by a mandate from the alleged beneficiaries of their activities, they are free to hop 
from one cause to another without addressing any of them in a systematic and 
effective manner. In such a situation, the recognition of the rights and needs of 
distant strangers is unlikely to have any lasting consequences in terms of the 
freedom of those strangers. 
While all the foregoing dangers are real, the trap into which transnational NGOs 
are most likely to fall is that of engaging in practices and discourses of recognition 
that have unintended harmful consequences (type 3). These consequences may 
flow from either of two related characteristics of other-regarding global activism. 
The first is a tendency on the part of NGOs to emphasize the inability of victims of 
injustice to help themselves and the consequent need for outside intervention. This 
message, and the accompanying rhetoric, can be appropriated by foreign political 
and military elites to justify or rationalize otherwise illegitimate intervention. The 
implication of this is that NGO activism can have the unintended side effect of 
strengthening and legitimating already powerful states, which in turn can be 
harmful to global justice. The second characteristic is the tendency of NGOs not to 
be content with identifying victims and always to look for ‘evil-doing’ perpetrators 
to carry the blame. This approach is inherently problematic, because it 
oversimplifies real-world situations, ignoring these in favour of misleading movie-
style clichés of villains cooking up nefarious plots.  
What is more, there is a danger of grievances and wrongdoers being 
misidentified—as the recent history of the European-sponsored anti-biotechnology 
movement in developing countries shows. A few years ago, a global coalition of 
NGOs tried to mobilize the Indian and global public against the globalization of 
agriculture, the activities of multinational corporations, and the introduction of 
hybrid seeds by arguing that these were the root causes of misery and dependence 
among Indian farmers. The mobilization failed because the activists misjudged the 
needs and attitudes of the farmers, who preferred a cautious wait-and-see 
approach to the new biotechnologies—and in some cases actually started growing 
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genetically modified cotton before it was officially approved. As Ron Herring 
writes, ‘the interests of farmers’ were incompatible with ‘the perceptions of farmer 
interests by activists’ (Herring 2006: 483). What is worse, urban NGOs were guilty 
of the ‘cultural denigration of rural people’ (Herring 2006: 474) in that they 
underestimated their diffuse power and their capacity to think and decide for 
themselves. Notwithstanding all the talk about ‘the weapons of the weak’, NGOs 
can be patronizing, lacking in accountability, and indeed dismissive of their basic 
obligation to get the data right. 
In cases where it is difficult to single out perpetrators, there is a tendency to 
blame entire cultures. In the United States, for example, young African women 
have been granted political asylum on the basis of their fear of genital mutilation 
and forced marriage. The flip-side of this welcome gesture of recognition has been 
the construction and indictment of ‘African culture’ as cruel, misogynistic, and 
essentially oppressive (McKinley 2009). This is a case of manufacturing consent by 
cultivating hostility towards an incorrectly identified cause of suffering. More 
generally, there is a streak of misanthropy in the Western obsession with global 
victims. The paradox is that NGOs risk misrecognizing entire societies because they 
see little that is positive in the environments from which they draw their issues—
environments that are made up exclusively of passive victims and their abusers. For 
example: contemporary cosmopolitan activists tend to single out ‘poverty’ as the 
sole cue for thinking about entire continents such as Africa, not realizing that 
Africans may interpret this compassionate representation as a form of denigration. 
Referring to anti-poverty campaigns in Britain, a well-known South African 
businessman made the point that ‘[i]n a continent of nearly 700 million people, 50 
very different countries and hundreds of different languages … there is another 
Africa, vibrant and full of potential that also demands recognition’ (Oppenheimer 
2005). 
The core problem here is the weakness of the organic ties of most transnational 
NGOs to the groups they claim to be defending from harm. The causal arrow 
usually points, not from shocking experiences that profoundly affect the lives of 
individuals to the foundation and growth of advocacy organizations, but the other 
way round. Instead of victims creating the conditions in which particular claims 
about their suffering resonate with a wider audience, we have distant non-victims 
making representational claims in regard to victims and seeking ‘authenticity rents’ 
(Herring 2006: 483–6) by asserting that their critique comes ‘from below’. 
NGOs are normally run by restricted circles of unelected professionals and are 
externally funded through private donations or public sponsorship. This tendency 
to bypass broader constituencies has obvious strategic advantages in terms of 
flexibility and networking. Whilst well-suited to the environments in which 
international policy deliberations take place, NGOs often prove less than effective 
at channelling the aspirations of ordinary citizens who want to get involved in 
political life. The ‘diminished democracy’ (Skocpol 2003) of NGOs mirrors and 
reinforces that of international organizations, and vice versa. Because of their 
specialist knowledge and their carefully crafted air of authenticity and democratic 
rootedness, NGOs make interesting partners for international and supranational 
organizations. Conversely, NGOs are attracted to international organizations 
because they are not the handmaidens of the governments that created them and 
because they are engaged in global rule-making, often without being accountable 
to electorates and parliaments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As a result of their 
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efforts to secure legal recognition, NGOs have managed to expand their influence 
in tandem with the rise of international organizations and other unelected bodies 
vested with official powers. 
Two aspects of the growing influence of NGOs on international public policy need 
to be distinguished. Over recent decades, particularly in relation to the United 
Nations system and through processes of improved ‘vertical’ recognition, NGOs 
have been able to expand and consolidate their formal standing with all relevant 
treaty bodies (Alger 2007). With regard to individual states, formal consultative and 
financial relations between governments and NGOs have been strengthened—
even in countries such as France, where the state long balked at the idea of funding 
or lending its ear to non-state partners (Cumming 2009). The move towards 
increased formality is reflected in the current humanitarian system, which is 
increasingly driven by state money and contractual arrangements between 
governments and NGOs (Coyne 2013). In the field of advocacy campaigns, NGOs 
have also initiated or participated in various informal coalitions with states, mostly 
with the aim of establishing or bolstering harm conventions. The successful 
international campaign to ban landmines and the campaign for the creation of the 
ICC are well-known examples of informal coalitions of this kind, in which NGOs join 
with some states to counter others (Kirkey 2001; Sending and Neumann 2006). 
Whereas states—which have a tendency to talk only to other states—are 
traditionally ill-equipped to function in complex multi-stakeholder environments, 
NGOs have proved to be exceptionally good at facilitating and brokering coalitions, 
particularly between small states and non-state actors (Neumann 2013: 83–4). 
From the normative standpoint of critical recognition theory, there is no way to 
tell a priori whether all this is good or bad news. However, what the analysis 
presented here suggests is that it would be precipitate to conclude that NGOs are 
by definition forces for good, provided they are not corrupted by state power. My 
point, rather, is that states and international organizations can also be corrupted by 
NGOs—if, for example, they buy into the false authenticity claims and ill-informed 
agendas of what may be seen as self-appointed guardians of global morality. NGOs 
are not born morally superior to states, or indeed to businesses. Their critical, 
creative, and attention-focusing role has a dark side too. In the new global 
separation of powers currently emerging, all these actors—states, businesses, and 
advocacy organizations—deserve recognition to the extent that they limit each 
other’s power to harm. Since 9/11, for example, states have been instrumental in 
eliminating jihadist NGOs and bringing transnational Muslim NGOs into the 
mainstream of professional advocacy groups and global service providers 
(Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2011; Petersen 2012; Thaut et al. 2012). Other 
groups are playing an important role in speeding up corporate change in the fields 
of climate and environmental politics and in exposing the unjust nature of state 
policies relating to vulnerable populations (Skocpol 2013). 
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Conclusion: The Rise and Recognition of the 
Unelected 
There are various ways of conceptualizing NGOs in democratic and international 
relations theory. In this paper I have suggested a definition of NGOs as civil and 
cooperative associations working on behalf of, and for the recognition of, others. 
The irony is that these inclusionary efforts have an exclusionary side. International 
NGOs are unelected authorities wielding considerable power both in the public 
sphere and in the context of regulative and law-making institutions. Much has been 
written about governments remaining impervious to the moral rhetoric of NGOs, 
but the more important point is that the beliefs and preferences of NGOs are often 
not shared by the people either. While NGOs may see themselves as agents of 
moral redemption in international society, they are also unelected authorities 
whose legitimacy is permanently open to question. They should therefore be 
regarded as the human face of what Frank Vibert (2007) has called the ‘global rise 
of the unelected’—in other words, entities who govern the globe for and on behalf 
of, but without being authorized by, the people. 
Given this status, NGOs cannot be expected to contribute to transnational forms 
of democracy (Greven 2005). Their value in relation to new forms of governance 
lies elsewhere. Apart from helping to facilitate global cooperation, they are good 
at anticipating crises and are willing to say what is unsayable in the arena of 
electoral politics. Like other expert bodies, they are cut off from the noise of 
representative democracy; but unlike technocrats, they are well-attuned to the 
sound of impending danger. 
Recognition theory can serve as a resource for assessing contrasting claims about 
the legitimacy of transnational NGOs. In principle, there is nothing wrong with the 
notion of third-party intervention in global struggles for recognition. The fact that 
NGOs are unelected is also not in itself a problem. In modern societies, unelected 
professionals and agencies working in areas such as food protection, aviation 
security, and child support are vital in protecting citizens from harm. The same is 
true of statisticians, auditors, and central banks. These agencies rely for their 
legitimacy not on civic participation but on their specialist knowledge (Vibert 2007). 
Similarly, truly civic-minded NGOs distinguish themselves from elected bodies in a 
democracy by their eagerness to gather and disseminate harm-related information 
that is not skewed by governmental or corporate bias. Unlike the ‘bad’ NGOs 
mentioned before, these organizations are ideally characterized by ‘a more open 
acknowledgement of the incompleteness, uncertainties and disputes that 
accompany facts and empirical knowledge’ (Vibert 2007: 168). 
Another way in which NGOs can contribute to the quality of democracy is by 
fostering organic, cooperative relations with the sections of global society they 
speak for. This is best achieved when victims of perceived injustice take the 
initiative in creating their own international advocacy groups. Although historically 
NGOs have had a tendency to engage in advocacy on behalf of victims of abuse 
who cannot, or are not expected to, speak for themselves (political prisoners, for 
example), there have been cases where marginalized victims have successfully 
‘gate-crashed’ established NGOs and persuaded their leaders to embrace new 
issues (see the examples in Bob 2009; Mertus 2009). In order to be effective and 
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legitimate interveners in struggles for recognition, NGOs need to be seen to have 
deeply anchored roots. Organic ties do not have to be based on elections, but they 
do require openness, reciprocity, and mutual trust. They require what Edmund 
Burke called ‘a communion of interests, and a sympathy of feelings and desires 
between those who act in the name of any description of the people, and the 
people in whose name they act’ (cited in Eagleton 2009: 62). 
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